After securing systems by hiding them completely from the network/internet using Single Packet Authorization, I’ve recently been interested in doing more so-called ‘active’ defense, by implementing solutions to delay, confuse, or thwart attackers. Completely hiding one’s system is not always feasible (ie. in the case of an internet-facing server), and monitoring, apart from being purely reactive, is not always easy and requires the involvement of a human. An alternative to these is to do some automated active defense. One simple tool in the bag of active defense tricks is the honeyport. Read more
The Pwnie Express (PwnPlug) is a great little tool for hackers, pentesters and social engineers alike. While I don’t advocate the use of a Pwnie for illicit purposes, I was intrigued about using it as an untraceable tap into a network. Out of the box the Pwnie allows you to configure reverse SSH connections, exfiltrated over a number of different protocols including HTTP, SSL, ICMP and DNS.
While these are great for getting out of controlled networks, they all require the Pwnie to be configured with the IP address of your SSH server, which could potentially be traced back to you. It also requires your SSH server to be able to directly receive connections at the IP/hostname configured on the Pwnie. While one could run an SSH server on a proxy box somewhere, I felt that was too primitive, so I installed Tor on my Pwnie and configured a Tor Hidden Service on my SSH server.
Note: For the purposes of this tutorial, the SSH server will be running on BackTrack 5. I’m assuming you’ve already performed the initial Pwnie Express setup steps on the server! Check out my PwnieScripts to help speed up and automate the Pwnie setup.
These instructions do not yet work on Pwn Plug software >= 1.1 as they’ve changed the layout of things! Will update this post when I get the time.
Apple’s popular Find My iPhone feature of MobileMe is being extended to Macs as well, as part of iCloud and Lion (10.7.2). It will also allow the person who found or stole the machine to login using a limited guest account (with only access to Safari), in order to allow your Mac to connect to the internet. As with the iOS version, Find My Mac will allow you to remotely send a message, lock or even wipe your computer.
I’m guessing the geolocation will be limited to triangulating local wireless networks, but I’m hoping it will also send back the public IP address of the network it’s currently connected to, which would help significantly when trying to recover a stolen device. I wonder how developers of commercial Mac tracking software are feeling right about now?
In a post to the OpenBSD mailing list, developer Theo de Raadt reveals an email from an ex-contributor (Gregory Perry) alleging that money was accepted from the FBI around 2000-2001, in return for implementing a backdoor into the IPSec stack. Such a backdoor would give the FBI the ability to eavesdrop on any IPSec connection made using OpenBSD, or any other projects that have since made use of its IPSec code.
Clearly this would be a big deal if true, and although we know that open source projects are regularly backdoored by rogue developers or ‘hackers’ (such as the recent ProFTPd backdoor), it is not often that we hear of governments inserting some themselves. Should we be surprised? After all it is known that the NSA was involved with the development of DES by altering the algorithm’s S-Boxes and suggesting a shorter key length. There are also rumors of a covert backdoor in several versions of the Windows OS. That said, many people are smelling a troll in this case.
Following this information (can we call it a leak rumor?), OpenBSD’s IPSec code will undoubtedly come under quite a bit of scrutiny, and I’m sure we will hear a lot more about it should anything untoward be uncovered.
Read the full mailing list post here, archived below for posterity.
[Update] Scott Lowe denies being affiliated with the FBI, and Jason Wright denies having inserted a backdoor. This is sounding more and more like a trolling. To what end, I couldn’t speculate. It’s also worth noting that this kind of activity would probably not fall under a normal NDA, but under a government-level Top Secret classification which lasts at least 25 years…
The cables, which date from 1966 up until the end of February this year, contain confidential communications between 274 embassies in countries throughout the world and the State Department in Washington DC. 15,652 of the cables are classified Secret.
The embassy cables will be released in stages over the next few months. The subject matter of these cables is of such importance, and the geographical spread so broad, that to do otherwise would not do this material justice.
The cables show the extent of US spying on its allies and the UN; turning a blind eye to corruption and human rights abuse in “client states”; backroom deals with supposedly neutral countries; lobbying for US corporations; and the measures US diplomats take to advance those who have access to them.
One cable reveals that China’s Politbureau was responsible for the attacks against Google China back in January 2010.